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NOTES

DEFAULT RULES IN THE
GUARANTY CONTEXT

I.

INTRODUCTION

Commercial creditors employ the guaranty to lower the risk of
nonpayment by debtors.' While courts enforce guaranty agreements
routinely,2 they often face disputes involving events or occurrences
about which the guaranty agreement is silent. 3 Scholars have provided little assistance as they rarely have addressed the theoretical
justifications for enforcement of guaranty agreements, let alone
rules of construction for gaps in the guaranty agreements.4
This note addresses and resolves three issues: (i) whether
enforcement of guaranty agreements is justified in the model guaranty situation; (ii) whether the occurrence of events not specifically
addressed in an agreement affects the justifications for general
enforcement; and (iii) what default rule best serves specific situations.

I.

HERSCHEL W. ARANT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §

1, crmt. at 1-3 (1931).
2. JAMES L. ELDER, THE LAW OF SURETYSHip § 4.1 (5th ed. 1951).

3. See, e.g., First Wisconsin Fin. Corp. v. Yamaguchi, 812 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1987) (finding that termination of guarantor's employment with the debtor limits liability
if the guarantor revokes the guarantee and is granted a release); United States Shoe Corp.
v. Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a guaranty must be revoked if the guarantor would be responsible for increased risk as a result of the debtor's
merger with another corporation).
4. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 743-44 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bargain Principle] (discussing half-completed performance of bargain); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 655-56 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Consideration] (asserting
that a guaranty as a "collateral"/"ancillary" document should be enforced because of fairness and social interest in certainty of planning).
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This note examines the special, continuing guaranty, which
addresses a specific person and contemplates a series of transactions to which the guaranty applies.' Specifically, this note discusses the theoretical justifications for enforcing a special, continuig guaranty executed by an officer, director, or shareholder of a
corporate debtor in a model guaranty situation. Additionally, the
note analyzes the inadequacies of current contract theory when
gaps exist in the guaranty agreement. After reviewing general theories of default rules, the note presents a model default rule to be
applied by the courts when certain situations arise which are not
specifically addressed in the guaranty agreement.
Part II of the note discusses briefly the modem uses for the
guaranty and reviews judicial treatment of guaranties. Part II also
defines a model guaranty situation and uses the model to justify
general enforcement of guaranties.
Applying contract theories to the model guaranty situation,
Part Ill explains why enforcement of the guaranty is justified in
the model situation. It further explains why those same theories fail
to resolve the issue of enforcement when events occur which are
not specifically addressed in the guaranty agreement.
Finally, general theories of default rules are applied in Part IV
to fashion an optimal default rule for liability upon the occurrence
of three events in the absence of express terms in the agreement
addressing the events: (1) termination of the guarantor's relationship with the debtor; (2) change of the debtor's name; and (3)
merger by the debtor.

5. A special guaranty is addressed to a specific party, and that party is the only
person who can enforce the guaranty. ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.4. But see Essex Int'l,
Inc. v. Clamage, 440 F.2d 547, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that a creditor's successor
can enforce guaranty so long as relationship between debtor and successor is substantially
similar to that between debtor and creditor, even though special guarantees are not assignable); ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. Kimmel, 508 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (construing guaranty to include liability to creditor's successor where the guaranty
contract allows the assignment and modifications to the loan agreements without affecting
the guaranty). A continuing guaranty is an agreement which contemplates a future course
of dealing covering a series of transactions. ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.7; see also Cargill,
Inc. v. Buis, 543 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding that absent an express contrary
intent, a guaranty is presumed to be continuing).
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II.

A.
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CURRENT TREATMENT OF THE GUARANTY
AND THE MODEL GUARANTY SITUATION

Purposes and Judicial Treatment of the Guaranty

A guaranty serves "to secure a creditor ... against loss
caused by the failure of [the] debtor ... to perform [the debtor's]
duties."6 Most commonly, the guaranty consists of a promise to
pay if the principal debtor fails to pay. Presumably, a creditor
resorts to the guaranty when the principal debtor has insufficient
security or reputation to justify extending credit.' The guaranty
provides the creditor recourse against
two separate parties, thus
9
reducing the creditor's risk of loss.
Special rules apply to guaranty agreements which that benefit
and protect guarantors." First, where the guaranty is a continuing

6. ARANT, supra note 1, § 1. The concept of guaranty "antedates the Christian era,"
and was historically used to ensure performance by another. Willis D. Morgan, The History and Economics of Suretyship, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 153, 153 (1927). Roman law favored

the surety because the relationship emanated from friendship and was normally gratuitous.
Phillip K. Jones, Jr., Roman Law Bases of Suretyship in Some Modern Civil Codes, 52
TUL L. REV. 129, 129 (1977); see also Morgan, supra, at 159 (discussing the many rules
benefitting sureties in ancient Rome). While both Morgan and Jones use the term "surety," the Roman concept of surety resembles the present-day guaranty as the Roman surety
was only secondarily liable. See Jones, supra, at 129 (likening the popular relationship of
ancient Rome to contemporary western ideas). For various discussions of the historical
developments of surety, see generally Jones, supra (exploring Roman bases of suretyship);
Morgan, supra (discussing development of surety idea from 2750 B.C. to beginning of
20th century); Max Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CAL. L. REV. 605 (1929) (examining the history of the terms "guaranty" and "surety" and discussing whether they can be
used interchangeably).
7. See ARANT, supra note 1, § 7 cmnt. (asserting that a guarantor's promise is always
subject to the default by the principal obligor).
8. Id. § I cmt.
9. Id.
10. See generally ARANT, supra note 1, §§ 7-14, §§ 22-26 (categorizing rules applicable to guaranty agreements). Some of these rules impose secondary liability. See, e.g., IIT
Diversified Credit Corp. v. Kimmel, 508 F. Supp. 140, 143 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding
guarantor liable upon default of debtor); ARANT, supra note 1, § 6 ("A guarantor is one
who promises . . . that, if another does not perform his duty, [the guarantor]
will . . . ."); ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.1. A general rule of strict construction applies to

guarantees. See, e.g., Bernardi Bros., Inc. v. Great Lakes Distrib., Inc., 712 F.2d 1205,
1206-07 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a guarantor was not liable for anything to which he
did not agree and that material change in debtor-creditor relationship relieves guarantor);
International Paper Co. v. Grossman, 541 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (relieving
guarantor of obligation where the guaranty agreement referred to one corporation as debtor
and that corporation merged out of existence); Kimmel, 508 F. Supp. at 142-43 (plain
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guaranty, which contemplates a series of credit transactions, the
guarantor may revoke the guaranty as to future liability at any time
upon notice to the creditor." Second, a guarantor is relieved of
liability if an event occurs that materially increases the guarantor's
risk.' 2 Both rules protect the guarantor from being exposed to potentially unlimited liability.
To revoke a continuing guaranty with respect to future transactions, the guarantor need only notify the creditor of its intent to
revoke.' 3 A unilateral act by guarantor is sufficient. The creditor's
acceptance is not necessary.' 4 The notice given to the creditor
must definitely and unequivocally communicate the guarantor's
intent to revoke.' 5 Particular words, however, are not required, as

language of the guaranty agreement controlled); ELDER, supra note 2, '§ 4.2 ('rule[s] of
strict construction app[ly] . . . where the intent of the parties is clearly expressed in the
instrument . . . "). When language is ambiguous, some courts construe the guaranty
against the party who drafted it - usually the creditor. See International Paper Co., 541
F. Supp. at 1240 (construing the guaranty against International Paper, the party who prepared it); cf. ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.2 cmt. (suggesting construction according to the
intent of the parties as agreements are often drawn up without assistance of counsel).
11. ARANT, supra note 1, § 22; see also First Wisconsin Fin. Corp. v. Yamaguchi,
812 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that "under Wisconsin law any clearly communicated revocation of a guaranty is effective"); United States Shoe Corp. v. Hackett,
793 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the guarantor was free to revoke at any
time, but failed to do so). Upon revoking the agreement, the guarantor is relieved of
liability for credit extended to the debtor after the date of revocation. ARANT, supra note
1, § 22; see also, e.g., Yamaguchi, 812 F.2d at 374 (finding a letter to creditor served as
notice of guarantor's revocation as to future extensions of credit); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Katz, 489 F.2d 1374, 1376 (7th Cir. 1973) (releasing guarantor from liability for all credit
extended after notice of revocation given).
12. ARANT, supra note 1, § 25; see also, e.g., Bernardi Bros., 712 F.2d at 1207
(recognizing material changes in terms discharges a guarantor's liability, but finding
debtor's change of name and incorporation to be non-material changes); Gritz Harvestore,
Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 769 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that both compensated and uncompensated guarantors may be discharged if a material
change works to the detriment of the guarantor); Hackett, 793 F.2d at 162; Essex Int'l,
Inc. v. Clamage, 440 F.2d 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that the sale of assets, in
order to consolidate two busineses, did not effect a material change in the obligation of
the guarantor).
13. ARANT, supra note 1, § 22; ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.20; see also Cargill, Inc. v.
Buis, 543 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1976) (implying that the guarantor's right of termination exists pursuant to law); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Lee, 504 P.2d 807, 809
(Idaho 1972) (noting that guarantor could have revoked agreement, but did not); Alton
Banking & Trust Co. v. Sweeney, 481 N.E.2d 769, 774 (III. App. Ct. 1985) (same). But
see United States Shoe Corp. v. Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that
the right to termination specifically provided by most guarantees may suggest that no such
right is provided by law).
14. First Wisconsin Fin. Corp. v. Yamaguchi, 812 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1987).
15. Id.
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long as the intent to revoke is reasonably communicated.16
Similarly, the guarantor is relieved of liability if an event
occurs that materially increases the risk involved with the transaction.'" The guarantor is released because such a risk-altering event
undercuts the assumptions upon which the contract was bargained. 8 Prior to entering the contract, the guarantor calculates
the risk involved with a potential debtor, considering both the
fimancial condition of the debtor and the extent of anticipated exposure.' 9 Some jurisdictions refuse to apply this rule when the guarantor participates in the event which increases the risk.2" In other
jurisdictions, relief depends on whether the creditor knows about
the risk-altering event.2 1 Nonetheless a material increase in risk of
default by the primary debtor frequently relieves the guarantor of
liability.
B.

The Model Guaranty Situation

The following is a model guaranty situation. Party X is in a
position to extend credit to Y, a corporation. X will not extend
credit to Y, however, unless Z (an officer, director or shareholder
of 1) executes a guaranty in favor of X which covers all of the
debts incurred by Y to X. Z executes the guaranty. No event occurs
that is not expressly provided for in the guaranty agreement. Y
fails to pay X. X demands payment from Z pursuant to the guaranty. The issue raised in this model guaranty situation is whether Z
should be liable to X for the debt Y incurred.
Certain assumptions support the model guaranty situation and

16. Id. at 372-73.
17. See, e.g., United States Shoe Corp. v. Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 162 (7th Cir. 1986)

(finding that a merger did not materially increase risk so as to allow discharge of liability); Bemardi Bros., Inc. v. Great Lakes Distrib. Inc., 712 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (7th Cir.
1983) (disallowing discharge since company name change and incorporation were not
material changes in business dealings).
18. Hackett, 793 F.2d at 162.
19. Id.; ARANT, supra note 1, § 25 cmt.
20. Hackett, 793 F.2d at 163; see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Lee, 504 P.2d
807, 808 (Idaho 1972) (finding guarantor estopped from claiming relief under rule since
president participated in the change of business which altered the risk); Metze v. Entman,
584 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (declining to release a guarantor who knew
about a corporate dissolution).
21. See ARANT, supra note 1, § 25; International Paper Co. v. Grossman, 712 F.2d
1236, 1240 (creditor's awareness of event was one ground for release of guarantor);
Mountain States TeL & TeL, 504 P.2d at 808 (noting no indication creditor was aware of
event).
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are necessary to an analysis justifying the model. First, X would
have refused to extend credit to Y if Z had not executed the guaranty.2 Second, extending credit benefits both Y, by increasing or
preserving its currently available cash, and Z, because of Z's connection with y. 23 Third, Z has access to information which will
assist Z in evaluating the risk of Y's nonpayment. 24 Fourth, Z can
review and negotiate the terms of the guaranty agreement before
executing it.25 Finally, Z is in a position to (i) re-evaluate regularly the risk of Y's nonpayment, (ii) control the risk either by limiting the amount of debt Y incurs or compelling payment, and (iii)
revoke the guaranty if the risk becomes too great.2 6
The next section of this note discusses the theoretical justification for enforcing the guaranty in the model guaranty situation27
and the inadequacy of existing theories for resolving the enforcement issue when the occurence of one or more events causes deviation from the model.28
III.

CONTRACT THEORIES SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT OF A
GUARANTY IN THE MODEL SITUATION BUT
NOT IN SITUATIONS DEVIATING FROM THE MODEL

Commentators have developed a number of theories to justify

enforcement of contracts. 29 This section discusses four contract

22. See ARANT, supra note 1, § I cmt.
23. See Hackett, 793 F.2d at 162 (involving benefit to shareholder-guarantor realized by
appreciation of debtor corporation's stock).
24. Id. at 163.
25. See Ivy v. Grenada Bank, 401 So.2d 1302, 1303 (Miss. 1981) (holding failure to
review a guaranty prior to execution not a defense to guarantor liability). But see Peter
A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Agreements in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions,
61 N.C. L. REV. 655, 660 (1983) (suggesting guarantors are generally in a weaker bargaining position and, therefore, unable to amend through negotiation terms requested by
the creditor).
26. See Hackett, 793 F.2d at 163 (noting that guarantors in influential positions in a
debtor corporation are usually aware of events which will increase the risk under the
guaranty and can control that risk); see also supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
27. See infra notes 29-62 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 63-90 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theomy of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269 (1986) (including critique of earlier theories and proposal of a theory based on consent); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553, 575-80 (1933)
(presenting the will theory and injurious reliance theory); Eisenberg, Bargain Principle,
supra note 4 (discussing the bargain theory of contract); Eisenberg, Consideration, supra
note 4 (reviewing the consideration doctrine); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson,
Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CI. L.
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theories - the Will Theory, the Bargain Theory, the Consent
Theory, and the Reliance Theory3" - and applies them to the
model guaranty situation. Each theory justifies enforcement of the
guaranty in the model situation. However, none resolves the problem of enforcement when events occur that are not expressly addressed in the guaranty occur.
A.

Contract Theories Justify Enforcement
of the Guaranty in the Model Situation
1. The Will Theory

The Will Theory posits that "the law of contract gives expression to and protects the will of the parties," as something that is
"inherently worthy of respect." 3 ' This theory assumes that parties
voluntarily enter into contracts.32 It also assumes that individual
responsibility for voluntary acts should be enforced because each
party has chosen to be bound.3 3 Pursuant to this theory, the.
parties' subjective intent regarding the binding nature of the contract must be ascertained 34 before the contract can be enforced.35
The Will Theory supports enforcement of Z's promise to pay
in the model guaranty situation. The guarantor, Z, voluntarily expressed an intent to be liable for Y's debts to X. 36 When Y fails
to pay, the condition precedent to Z's liability has occurred. 37 Because Z's will is "inherently worthy of respect '3 and Z's individ-

REV. 903 (1985) (reporting the emergence of a judicial trend expanding promissory estoppel and proposing that every commercially-related promise be enforced); Jay M. Feinman,
Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984) (relating promissory estoppel to other contract theories); Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and
Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969) (discussing expanded judicial use
of promissory estoppel to include bargain transactions as well as gratuitous transfers).
30. The Reliance Theory section addresses only the traditional use of promissory estoppel.
31. Cohen, supra note 29, at 575. Cohen criticizes the Will Theory because the rights
and duties imposed often may not be truly voluntary. Id. at 576-77.
32. 11 at 555. But see id. at 569 (suggesting that when one party effectively cannot
refuse, the contract is not truly voluntary).
33. Barnett, supra note 29, at 272; Cohen, supra note 29, at 556-57 (tracing this concept to religious canons).
34. Barnett, supra note 29, at 272.
35. Cohen, supra note 29, at 575.
36. See id. at 556-57.
37. See ARANT, supra note 1, § 6; ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.1.
38. Cohen, supra note 29, at 575.
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ual responsibility should be enforced,3 9 the courts should enforce
Z's promise to pay X.
2.

The Bargain Theory

The Bargain Theory argues that "each party views the performance that he undertakes as the price of the performance undertaken by the other." The theory favors adherence to the terms of
the bargain unless a defense relating to the quality of the consent,
such as duress, mental mistake, misrepresentation or incapacity,
exists.4" When one party has already performed,4 2 fairness and
predictability warrant enforcement of the other party's promise to
perform.43 Therefore, the bargain, as expressed by the parties, is
enforced.44
The Bargain Theory supports enforcement of the guaranty in
the model situation. Z executes the guaranty in exchange for X
extending credit to Y. Because X already performed under the
contract by extending credit to Y, the bargain between Z and X
should be enforced.45
3.

The Consent Theory

The Consent Theory supports enforcement of consensual transfers of alienable rights.46 To find consent, the courts should look
for "a manifestation of an intention to be legally bound."47 Intent
can be manifested in words or conduct.4 8 A written agreement
serves as evidence of an intent to be bound. 9 These requirements
39. Id. at 556-57.
40. Eisenberg, Bargain Principle, supra note 4, at 742.
41. Id.
42. For example, X has already extended credit to Y Corporation.
43. Eisenberg, Bargain Principle, supra note 4, at 744. Credit transactions, in particular, are viable only if the promisee is held liable. Id. at 746. However, enforcement of
the debtor's promise relates more directly to the viability of credit transactions.
44. See id. at 744 (indicating that extent to which promises should be enforced remains unresolved).
45. See id. at 743-44 (discussing justification for half-completed-bargain promises).
46. Barnett, supra note 29, at 293, 299. In order to find a contract enforceable, the
subject matter must deal with an alienable right. For example, a contract regarding slavery
would not be enforceable. Id. at 293.
47. Id. at 304.
48. Id. at 305-06. In this way, the promisor is -harmed- only when his conduct and
words are contrary to his intent. Id. Also, the person who ielies on the plain words and
conduct (and with no access to the promisor's true intent) is protected. Id. Therefore, the
interests of both parties are served.
49. Id. at 310-11. Consideration and reliance can also serve as evidence of intent. Id.
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help determine which contracts should be enforced.5"
Consent Theory supports enforcement in the model guaranty
situation. Ownership of money is an alienable right,"t and the express terms of the guaranty manifest Z's intent to be legally bound
by Z's promise to pay X in the event Y defaults.5 2 Z's acquiescence in X's extension of credit to Y comports with Z's intent as
expressed in the guaranty. Since Z manifested an intent to be
bound, Z is bound." Thus, Z's consensual promise to transfer
money to X is enforceable under the Consent Theory.' Z's consensual promise creates a moral and legally enforceable contractual
obligation.
4. The Reliance Theory
The Reliance Theory presents an alternative theory for contract
enforcement. Reliance Theory holds that "[a] promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." 5 Promissory estoppel was
originally intended to apply only to gratuitous promises. 56 Like
the bargain element of the Bargain Theory, the Reliance Theory includes inducement of a response. 7 However, under the Reliance
Theory, the party seeking to bind a party by a promise did not
bargain for the promise. 58 A promise is enforced under the Reliance Theory because reliance on the promise was reasonably foreseeable and injustice would occur if the promise were not enforced. 9
Although the existence of a bargain in commercial settings

at 312-17.
50. Id. at 319.
51. See id. at 293 (only contractual transfers involving alienable rights should be enforced).
52. See id. at 306, 310 (discussing formal, objective, written consent as the binding
expression of contractual obligations).
53. See id. at 306. Clear intent is binding. In addition, "[V]olitional acts - words or
deeds - that manifest assent to transfer entitlements presumptively bind the actor regardless of subjective intent." Id. at 306.
54. See id. at 293, 296.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(l) (1979).
56. Henderson, supra note 29, at 343-44.
57. Id. at 348.
58. Id.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) cmt. b.
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removes the need for analysis under the Reliance Theory (because
traditional contract theory would apply), courts have nonetheless
expanded application of promissory estoppel beyond gratuitous
promises to commercial contracts. 60
The Reliance Theory supports enforcement of the guaranty in
the model guaranty context. Z promised X that Z would pay, upon
default, the debt Y owes to X. X extended credit to Y in reliance
on Z's promise. 6 t Z knew X would rely on the promise because X
informed Z that it would only extend credit to Y if Z executed the
guaranty. Assuming injustice would result in the absence of enforcement, 62 Z's promise is enforced.
Thus, basic contract theory supports enforcement of the guaranty in the model guaranty situation. Uncertainty remains, however,
as to whether the guaranty should be enforced when events cause
deviations from the model guaranty situation. As the next section
demonstrates, contract theories fail to resolve this issue.
B.

Contract Theories Fail to Resolve Enforcement Issue
When Events Not Expressly Addressed
in the Guaranty Agreement Occur

The foregoing contract theories fail to resolve the enforcement
issue when an event not expressly addressed in the guaranty occurs. For purposes of this discussion, this note posits three hypothetical situations. First, suppose Z is no longer employed by Y.63
Next, suppose (i) Y changes its name to ABC 6' or (ii) Y merges

60. Henderson, supra note 29, at 368-69; see also Farber & Matheson, supra note 29,
at 929 (proposing that every commercially-related promise be enforced).
61. The model guaranty situation assumes that X would not have extended credit to Y
if Z had not made such a promise. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. The credit extended must be of a sufficient dollar amount for a court to find injustice in the absence of enforcement of the promise. See ELDER, supra note 2, § 4.2
(ignoring potential injustices and suggesting that, regardless of the promisor's intent, the
promisee's interpretation of an ambiguous term should govem if the promisee acted upon
the interpretation).
63. See, e.g., First Wisconsin Fin. Corp. v. Yamaguchi, 812 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir.
1987); Gritz Harvestore, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 769 F.2d 1225, 122627 (7th Cir. 1985); Union Carbide Corp. v. Katz, 489 F.2d 1374, 1376 (7th Cir. 1973)
(holding former president of corporation liable under guaranty); Pascoe Steel Corp. v.
Shannon, 298 S.E.2d 97, 97 (Va. 1982) (seeking to enforce guaranty after guarantorlstockholder sold his stock).
64. See, e.g., United States Shoe Corp. v. Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1986)
(suggesting that if there is no increase in risk, a merger of corporations might be treated
as nothing more than a name change).

19931

GUARANTY DEFAULT RULE

1239

with CD Corp. 65 Since the model guaranty does not address how
to deal with these events, the contract theories fail to resolve them.
As previously discussed, the Will Theory is based on the
belief that the parties' true intent should be enforced.' Therefore,
the Will Theory necessitates a subjective inquiry into the parties'
agreement.67 First, any subjective intent should prevail over a contrary objective expression of intent. 68 Therefore, if Z intended the
guaranty to apply only during the period of his employment with Y
(or only so long as Y retained its name or corporate structure),
then Z should be relieved of liability under the guaranty after Z's
employment terminates (or an event contrary to Z's expectation
occurs).6 9 Under this analysis, however, X would be harmed by
enforcement of the guaranty according to Z's subjective intent. This
result is especially troubling because Z's subjective desires may
have been unknown to X, who would therefore have been unable
to rely on Z's objective expression.7 ° On the other hand, allowing
X to prevail could not be squared with Z's subjective intent not to
be bound after the unstated event occurs. 7'
Second, the Will Theory posits that the parties should be
bound by the words of the contract. 72 No contract terms exist,
however, in the hypothetical posed for resolution here; the contract
is silent with regard to the occurrance of certain events. Should
silence regardiig the occurrence of an event be interpreted as an
intent to be bound notwithstanding the occurrence of any event not
specifically mentioned, or an indication that the intent to be bound
did not extend beyond the occurrence of the event?73 The Will
65. See, e.g., id. (holding that merger will cause cancellation of guaranty only if it
fundamentally alters risk of guaranty); Cargill, Inc. v. Buis, 543 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir.
1976) (addressing the issue of whether a guaranty survived the corporate merger of the
guarantee).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
67. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 29, at 272 (when determining whether to enforce
subjective intent, inquiry as to that intent is required).
68. See id. Consider, however, the difficulty a party would encounter in attempting to
demonstrate subjective intent contrary to the objective expression. See Cohen, supra note
29, at 576 (noting that, practically, if one's expressed will differs from subjective intent,
the expression will probably be enforced).
69. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 29, at 576.
70. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 29, at 273 (acknowledging that enforcement of purely
subjective intent opens the door for promisors to fraudulently induce others to contract by
concealing true intent).
71. See id. at 273-74.
72. See Cohen, supra note 29, at 575-76 (showing how objective manifestations of
intent will be enforced even if no meeting of the minds actually takes place).
73. See id. at 576-77 (recognizing that litigation often results when unforeseen events
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Theory does not resolve this dilemma.74
Similarly, the Bargain Theory, which is premised upon a
mutual inducement by the parties, does not provide a basis for
enforcing the guaranty. 76 Under this theory, the "price" of performance by one party counterbalances the "price" of performance by
the other party. 77 Giving effect to the terms of the express agreement enforces the bargain.7" The problem with the Bargain Theory in the guaranty context is that it focuses on whether or not bargain exists. The theory offers no basis for determining the content
of the bargain. 9 Therefore, the Bargain Theory is inadequate to
resolve guaranty disputes spawned by occurrences not addressed in
the guaranty.
The third theory, the Consent Theory,"0 distinguishes contracts which should be enforced from those which should not8'
but it does not describe the content of the contract. According to
this theory, the consensual bargain of the parties should be enforced if the court can find evidence of the parties' "manifestation"
of intent to be legally bound.82 For example, execution of a document manifests such an intent.8 3 The Consent Theory fails in the
guaranty context for the same reason that the Bargain Theory fails.
A finding that the parties intended to be bound advances neither
the case for or against enforcement under circumstances upon
which the guaranty is silent. While a guaranty evidences the parties
intent to be legally bound, the parties' intent to remain bound if Z
left the employ of Y or if Y ceases to be Y by changing its name
or merging with another entity is questionable." Z's acquiescence
to the loan can be equally ambiguous. If Z is no longer employed

occur about which no intent or will is expressed).
74. See id. at 577 ('[T]hese legal relations are determined by the courts and the jural
system and not by the agreed will of the contesting parties.").
75. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45,
76. Barnett, supra note 29, at 287.
77. Eisenberg, Bargain Principle, supra note 4, at 742.
78. Id.
79. Barnett, supra note 29, at 289-90.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
81. See Barnett, supra note 29, at 317 (suggesting that Consent Theory's role in distinguishing between which contracts should be enforced enables parties to structure their
relationships by knowing when an obligation will be imposed).
82. Id. at 304.
83. Id. at 310-11.
84. See id. at 314-17 (discussing the effect of reliance when specifics of intent are
ambiguous and noting that under the Consent Theory, reliance is only protected if there is
manifestation to be legally bound).
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by Y, Z will not observe X extending credit to Y. Similarly, if Y
becomes ABC, Z witnesses the extension of credit to ABC, not to
Y. Finally, if Y merges into CD Corporation, Z observes the credit
extension to Y's successor. In these scenarios, Z's silence does not
justify enforcement of the guaranty because silence may not inelude acquiesence. 85
Under the last theory, the Reliance Theory,86 the promisor
expects the promisee to rely on the promise. 7 Although execution
of the contract in the model guaranty situation presumably renders
the promisee's reliance reasonable, the theory fails to address
whether reliance can ever be "reasonable" with respect to an unstated contingency such as one of the aforementioned events. For
example, Z did not expressly promise that his liability would extend beyond the duration his employment with Y. In fact, the employment relationship is the reason Z is willing to assume secondary liability on the loan. Therefore, it may be reasonable to assume
that Z would not be bound after that relationship ends. As a result,
X's, argument for enforcing the guaranty would depend on the
reasonableness of relying on a promise by Z which fails to address
liability after employment terminates.
Whether or not reliance is reasonable also depends on what
most people would do in the same circumstances. 8 What most
people would do depends on whether they think the promise is
enforceable.8 Whether the promise is enforceable when, for example, Z leaves the employ of Y, depends on whether most people
would believe that Z's promise extended beyond the period of
employment. 90
Thus, the foregoing contract theories do not resolve the hypothetical issue posited. Because current contract theory proves inadequate, Part IV of this note presents an economic approach

85. See id. (stating that a particular interpretation of a missing or ambiguous contract
term can be enforceable if promisor stood by silently while promisee acted in reliance on
the interpretation).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
87. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979); Henderson,
supra note 29 (discussing promissory estoppel in contract theory).
88. Barnett, supra note 29, at 274-75; see Cohen, supra note 29, at 579-80 (noting
that not all injuries deserve redress because there may not have been reliance).
89. Barnett, supra note 29, at 275 (recognizing the circular argument that results from
again asking the initial question of whether this promise should be enforced).
90. See id. In a jurisdiction which has addressed the issue and resolved it in favor of
the creditor, reliance based on precedent would seem reasonable. However, the first case
in each jurisdiction must be addressed and rationally decided and supported.
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which provides optimal default rules to be applied in the three
situations presented.
IV.

ECONOMIC APPROACH PROVIDES OPTIAL DEFAULT RULES

The guaranty agreement between Z and X does not address the
parties' intentions regarding the occurrence of one or more of the
following events: 1) termination of Z's employment with Y; 2)
merger of Y with another corporation; and 3) name change by Y.
This section discusses how the courts should address and resolve
this dilemma.
The first issue is whether a gap exists in the contract. Silence
regarding the effect of the occurrence of an event does not necessarily mean that the parties did not contemplate occurrence of the
event or negotiate which party should bear any burden caused by
the event.9 If a gap exists, a court must decide what default rule
should apply.
Commentators have suggested various gap-filling theories. One
view advocates filling the gap according to what the parties would
have done had they negotiated the issue. 2 If a court chooses this
approach, it must also decide whether the default rule should be
tailored to the preferences of specific parties or should be based on
the assumed preferences of most parties in similar situations.9 3 A
second view suggests imposing a default rule to which neither
party would agree, a "penalty default rule," in order to discourage
less than thorough bargaining practices between the parties. 94 Regardless of the approach to be followed, courts announcing default
rules must also decide whether a rule should be immutable, or
whether parties can contract freely around the rule.9"

91. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term
Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 534 (1985) (noting that risks not expressly allocated in
the contract may be implicitly allocated according to the given circumstances or custom).
92. Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 707 (1989) (explaining that courts often fill in the gaps in contracts by determining what the parties
would have consented to "ex ante"); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and
the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 541 (1990);
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 3.
LEGAL STUD. 597, 639-91 (1990).
93. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 108-18 (1989).
94. Id. at 96-99.
95. See id. at 88-89.
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Because default rules are required only if a gap exists, the
court must determine the existence of a gap. Therefore, the factors
pertinent to a gap analysis are discussed here first. Next, the theories underlying default rules are analyzed. Finally, an appropriate
default rule is developed for each of the three contingencies described above.
A.

Existence Of A Gap

The first issue is whether a gap exists. Absence of an express
provision regarding the event does not necessarily mean that the
parties neither addressed the possibility of its occurrence nor agreed
who would bear the burden of its occurrence.' The parties may
have intended an existing default rule to resolve the conflict.' Or,
the parties may have intended to circumvent an existing default
rule by providing a more general assignment of risks between
them.9"
Ayres and Gertner suggest that a gap filling analysis should
involve three inquiries:" first, whether a current default rule applicable to the situation exists; second, if a default rule exists,
whether the rule is immutable or can be circumvented by contract;
third, if the rule can be circumvented, whether the parties expressed sufficient intent to circumvent the rule. An immutable
default rule governs the situation regardless of any attempt by the
parties to circumvent it. t°° However, if no default rule exists the
court must create one.
For a court to find that the parties successfully circumvented
an existing default rule, the parties must show some evidence of
intent to avoid application of the rule."0 ' The amount of evidence
sufficient to prove intent may vary. According to one theory, silence regarding circumvention should be construed as acceptance of

96. On the other hand, silence may mean precisely that the parties did not even address the issue and, as a result, cannot necessarily be interpreted as intent to accept a
default rule. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLuM. L. REv. 1416, 1445 (1989) ("[]t is costly for the parties . . . to ponder unusual
situations and dicker for the adoption of terms.").
97. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 119.
98. Gillette, supra note 92, at 538 (positing that terms regarding good faith or renegotiation may express intent to cooperate when unforeseen event occurs).
99. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 119.
100. Id. at 87.

101. Id. at 119.
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the default rule. "t Absence of a clear intent to circumvent may
also convey acceptance of the default position.' 3 According to
another view, circumvention may be implied by express terms
regarding rights and duties of the party that are inconsistent with
the default rule.'0 4 The higher the burden the courts place on parties to evidence their intent, the more likely it is that a default rule
will be immutable in practice if not in theory. 5
Since the gap analysis is fact-driven, some examples related to
the model guaranty situation may be helpful. First, assume that the
guaranty agreement contains Z's simple promise to pay X in the
event that Y fails to pay X. In a jurisdiction that has fashioned a
default rule which states that termination of employment does not
terminate the guarantor's liability,"° a court may interpret the
parties' silence as acceptance of the default rule. Similarly, in a
jurisdiction that has decided that a merger between the debtor and
a third party does not automatically relieve the guarantor of liability, 0 7 silence may be interpreted as acceptance of that rule. If circumvention cannot be implied from other contract terms, the contract might be viewed as complete because the parties intended to
include the default rule,'0 8 or incomplete because the parties never addressed the issue. For purposes of the remaining discussion,

102. Id.
103. Id. (discussing Judge Easterbrook's majority opinion in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps,
815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), a dispute regarding an employment/shareholder agreement).
104. Id. (discussing Judge Posner's dissent in Jordan); see also Gillette, supra note 92,
at 537-538 (stating that ambiguous terms may evidence intent to share risks caused by
event).
105. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 120-25. As the potential methods of circumvention dictate the ease with which parties can by-pass a default rule, a court should
specify those methods when it chooses a particular default rule. Id. See also infra note
177.
106. See, e.g., Gritz Harvestore, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 769 F.2d 1225,
1231-32 (7th Cir. 1985) (involuntary termination of employment is "insufficient as a matter of law to establish the defense of material changes in circumstances"); Bledsoe v.
Cargill, Inc., 452 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (holding guarantor liable even
after the sale of his interest in the principal company); Pascoe Steel Corp. v. Shannon,
298 So. 2d 97, 101 (Va. 1982) (holding guarantor liable for corporate debt after the sale
of his stock and termination of his administrative positions).
107. See, e.g., United States Shoe Corp. v. Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1986)
(applying Illinois law); Cargill, Inc. v. Buis, 543 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying
Indiana law); International Paper Co. v. Grossman, 541 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (applying Illinois and New York law and concluding that the facts of specific
merger constituted material change which resulted in release of the guarantor), aff'd, 725
F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1983).
108. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 107, at 120.
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the existence of a gap and the absence of an existing default rule
are assumed.
B. Potential Default Rules
Once the court finds that a gap exists, the court must determine how to fill the gap based on one of two theories. 109 First,
the court can fill the gap with a term to which neither party would
have agreed by imposing a penalty default rule. ° Second, the
court can fill the gap with the term to which the parties or most
parties similarly situated would have agreed."' The nature of the
contract and the manner in which it is negotiated should influence
the court's choice.
1. Penalty Default Rule
A penalty default rule induces at least one party to contract
around the default rule"' by either placing the burden on the
party whose behavior the court seeks to modify or giving neither
party what it wants. 1 3 Several situations justify a penalty default
rule. For example, one party may withhold information for strategic
purposes." 4 When warranted, a penalty default rule limits this
practice by encouraging the informed party to disclose the information to the other party. 5 In addition, a penalty default rule is
justified when the parties can fill in the term more cheaply than
the court." 6 The rule thus motivates at least one party to fill the
gap.
109. A guarantor may argue for release from liability upon the occurrence of a material
change which substantially increases the risk. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying
text. The factual orientation of such an inquiry, however, does not give the parties notice
of the effect on liability either before the event has occurred or after occurrence but before judicial decision.
110. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 91, 97-107; see also Gillette, supra note 92, at
575.
111. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 91; see also supra text accompanying notes
92-95.
112. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 91.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 94.
115. Id. at 94, 97. Compare id. with Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEAL STUD. 1, 13-14 (1978) (warning that rules
which force parties to disclose information obtained at some cost may be a disincentive to
obtaining such information).
116. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 96. When such a determination is made, one
should inquire whether standard information exists regarding such a transaction or whether
the court would be forced to determine the preferences of each party.
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The penalty default rule can place the burden on both parties
or on only one party. One penalty, non-enforcement, generally
harms both parties.117 Both sides would then be motivated to fill
in the gap.' On the other hand, placing the burden on one party
provides incentive to that party to address and resolve the issue." 9 When a rule burdens one party, however, the court must
be sensitive to the potential for opportunism by the unburdened
party. 120 For example, a non-burdened party aware of a default
rule in its favor can exact significant costs from the burdened party
to negotiate an allocation of risk preferable to both parties.121 The
burdened party may bear higher negotiation costs even though
courts intended the rule merely to promote dissemination of information.
Once the court decides to place the burden on one party, the
court must decide which party should bear the burden.'2 Since
one objective of a penalty default rule is dissemination of information, the court should consider the parties' relative access to information. One commentator suggests imposing the burden on the
party best able to obtain relevant information at the lowest
cost.123 This party would be encouraged to collect the relevant
information and transmit it to the other party. The cheapest information-gatherer could choose to accept liability or disclose the
information relevant to negotiating potential alternative terms.124
117. Id. at 97. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201 is one example. If the parties fail to
specify the quantity in a sales contract, a court will not complete the term. Id. at 96
n.43. Note, however, that non-enforcement of the guaranty is exactly what the guarantor is
requesting in our scenario. In this respect, the creditor is harmed, while the guarantor
receives a benefit.
118. Id. at 98 ("By taking each party back to her ex ante welfare, the non-enforcement
default eliminates this potential for opportunism.").
119. See id. The law should place the burden on one party, the relatively informed party, when the rationale is to inform the relatively uninformed party, especially if that party
is uninformed about the default rule itself. Id.
120. Id. ("The non-penalized buyer . . . would have incentives to induce sellers to enter
indefinite contracts in order to extract the penalty . .
").
121. Id; see also Scott, supra note 92, at 613-614 (the default rule will inevitably invite
cooperative responses from the burdened party and evasive responses from the non-burdened party).
122. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 98-99 (giving an example of how to allocate earnest money between the broker and the seller when a buyer defaults on a real estate
transaction).
123. Kronman, supra note 115, at 2-4. Kronman defines "mistake" as any error which
would not have been made if all information were available. Id. at 2 n.l. Since
"[information is the antidote to mistake," Kronman suggests imposing the risk on the
party that can most cheaply obtain and deliver the information. Id. at 4.
124. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 98 ("[l]n some situations it is reasonable
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Other commentators believe that the burden should be placed on
the party that engages repeatedly in similar transactions."' That
party presumably has superior knowledge about contingencies,
probabilities and applicable default rules. The penalty default rule
in this context encourages the burdened party to convey its superior knowledge to the less informed party.' 26 While placing the
burden on one party seems unfair, if the default rule is mutable,
the rule merely forces the burdened party (or parties) to negotiate
and resolve the issue to avoid liability.'2 7
2. What the Parties Want
A court can choose to fill a gap in a contract with the term to
which the parties would have agreed. 28 The cost of negotiating
terms to deal with certain contingencies may prohibit negotiation of
those terms.' 29 By implementing a rule which the parties would
have wanted, the court provides the solution the parties would have
provided without necessitating unduly high negotiation costs.13°
The court must decide, however, whether to shape a rule that the
particular parties would prefer (a "tailored" rule) or to shape a rule
that most parties similarly situated would select (an "untailored"
rule). '3'
A tailored default rule presumably better resolves the particular

to expect one party to the contract to be systematically informed about the default rule
and the probability of the relevant contingency arising.").
125. Id. at 98-99. In real estate transactions the broker has experience in similar transactions and thus should bear the burden instead of the relatively inexperienced seller. Id.
126. Id. at 99 ("[I]f the efficient contract would allocate [resources] . . . to the seller,
the default rule should be set against the broker to induce her to raise the issue.")
Knowledge of the default rule is as relevant as information regarding probability because
knowledge of consequences can help avoid a breach. Id. at 104. For example, a consumer
entering a sales contract, if informed about the default rule for a breach, will internalize
the cost of breaching and will therefore take precautions against breaching. Id. This decision is not concerned with which party bears the risk better because the goal is dissemination of information. Id. at 101. In addition, Kronrman's concern regarding rules reducing
incentive to obtain information is not relevant when the information concerns content of a
default rule or potential contingencies which may harm both parties. Kronman, supra note
115, at 13-14.
127. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 91.
128. Scott, supra note 92, at 598-99 (suggesting that the law should insert the terms
that would have been specified by the parties).
129. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 90 (suggesting that negotiation costs are not
always low enough to provide for every detail).
130. Id. (citing RICHARD POsNR , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986)).
131. Id. at 91; Scott, supra note 92, at 606-07 (referring to individualistic default rules
versus majoritarian default rules).
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conflict before the court because the court attempts to re-create the
circumstances under which the parties contracted and to analyze the
role played by each party.' 32 This in-depth judicial analysis, however, also constitutes one of the strongest objections to tailored default rules. Litigation costs increase when courts inquire into the
circumstances surrounding each transaction. 33 In effect, the costs
of completing the gaps in the contract shift from the negotiation
stage to the litigation stage, and governmental resources subsidize
contract negotiations."t 3 Further, the parties risk judicial misconstruction of the relationship and judicial error regarding the parties'
preferences.1 35 The cost of litigation and the risk of judicial misconstruction affect adversely the value of the contract.
Another problem with a tailored default rule relates to parties
strategically withholding information. Since the court supplies the
term to which the parties would agree if perfectly informed, a
party possessing superior information withheld for strategic purposes has a disincentive to supply the information during negotiation. 36 This reduces the efficiency of the contract.137 Therefore,
on balance, the disadvantages of a tailored default rule outweigh
the advantages.
An untailored default rule has benefits which favor its implementation. First, similarly situated parties not before the court may
avoid future negotiation costs because the default rule provides the
term which they would have chosen. 38 Second, parties who wish
to alter the burdens imposed by the untailored default
rule can
3
contract around the rule unless the rule is immutable. 1
Changing a rule midstream, however, can create additional
problems. As Ayres & Gertner explain, "[plarties who dislike a
given default rule will contract around it; if we change the default
rule to mimic the contracts these parties write, other types of par-

132. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 117.
133. Id.
134. Id. ("Instead of contracting costs, the costs of ex post tailoring are the costs of
distinguishing between types of contractual parties, where each type would have contracted
for a different rule.").
135. Id. at 117-18.
136. Id. at 118 (pointing out that a party with private information thus will not reveal
it to the court or other parties since the court will supply the terms that fully informed
parties would want).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 112 (pointing out that untailored default rules that are applied to different classes of contracting parties act as a penalty to some); Scott, supra note 92, at 607.
139. Id.
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ties may contract around the new default back to the original rule.
This process could cycle forever." 14 Contract costs therefore increase. An analysis of an untailored rule must therefore consider
what other parties would want, whether they can obtain what they
want, and at what cost. 141 As opposed to a tailored rule, howevconsidered untailored default rule
er, the advantages of a carefully
42
outweigh this disadvantage.
Regardless of whether a court chooses to fashion a tailored or
an untailored default rule, the court must create the rule by referring to general notions regarding the purposes for and the processes by which parties contract.1 43 First, the parties expect a mutual
gain to inure from the contract. 44 If a mutual cost-efficient benefit is not perceived, the parties will not contract. 45 Once the parties agree that contracting seems to offer gains, they will negotiate
the terms governing the contractual relationship. 46 If mutually
terms cannot be agreed upon, the
satisfactory and cost-efficient
47
parties fail to contract.
In the guaranty context, since the creditor and the guarantor
successfully reached an agreement, both parties presumably perceived mutual gains from the relationship and found the terms to
which they agreed mutually satisfactory and cost-efficient. The
terms to which they agreed can48 serve as a guide to the terms about
which the contract was silent.
An analysis of the method by which parties negotiate express
terms of a contract can guide an inquiry into the terms to which
the parties would have agreed had such terms been the subject of
negotiation. 49 Each material term of a contract maximizes the

140. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 115.
141. Id. at 116.
142. Precisely because of the onerous factual inquiry required to fashion a tailored default rule, Section C of Part IV presents untailored default rules.
143. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93 (taking an economic approach to
determining what type of default rules are appropriate); Coleman et al., supra note 92;
Gillette, supra note 92 (examining the bargaining theory of contracts); Scott, supra note
92.
144. Coleman et al., supra note 92, at 655, 656.
145. See id. at 655-58 (discussing potential pitfalls to contracting that may occur in the
.pre-phase," the time before the parties enter the contract).
146. Id. at 655 (describing this as the "negotiation phase," where parties attempt to
agree on the terms of their agreement).
147. Id.
148. Scott, supra note 92, at 603; see also Gillette, supra note 92, at 532-38 (ambiguous terms may evidence intention to share risks).
149. Scott, supra note 92, at 603.
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expected value of the contract t" by sharing risk,'s5 reducing
risk,52 or allocating risk.' Parties first address foreseeable and
controllable risks." 4
The manner in which parties negotiate express terms must be
assumed to be rational. 55 Concessions regarding a term are rational even if the value of the contract is reduced as a result, as long
as the cost continues to exceed the value of foregoing the contractual relationship. 56 Similarly, one party may rationally accept all
risk related to an event if that party is in a position to prevent the
risk and if the costs of shifting the risk to the other party render
further negotiation inefficient. 57 Therefore, concessions by parties
are expected.'
Although the foregoing insights attempt to explain how parties
decide express terms, they do not explain why parties do not address and resolve every contingency through concession. Two reasons prevent parties from addressing every possible contingency.
First, parties may not be capable of contemplating every contingency,1 59 and even if they could, identifying problems is costly."6
Second, negotiation costs may prohibit resolution of certain identified contingencies, 6 1 When a contingency is extremely unlikely
to occur and the anticipated negotiation costs exceed any perceived
benefit, the parties may prefer to deal with the problem if and
when it arises, either through re-negotiation or through litigation. 62 In addition, the parties may be willing to accept a less

150. Id. at 602.
151. Gillette, supra note 92, at 537-38.
152. Coleman et al., supra note 92, at 653; Scott, supra note 92, at 606.
153. Coleman et al., supra note 92, at 653. These commentators also define the terms
as a method for allocating the gains and burdens associated with the contractual relationship. Id. at 655.
154. Scott, supra note 92, at 603.
155. Id. at 602.
156. Coleman et al., supra note 106, at 651, 660.
157.

Scott, supra note 92, at 603.

158. But see Gillette, supra note 92, at 538-539 (noting egoistic parties who are willing
merely to gamble on a belief that their predictions about the future are correct and other
parties' contrary predictions are wrong).
159. Id. at 552-53; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 96, at 1444-45 (suggesting
that corporate law is needed to provide gap fillers in contracts when unanticipated problems arise).
160. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 96, at 1445 (noting that this expense will
have been wasted if the unusual event does not occur).
161. Coleman et al., supra note 92, at 641.
162. Gillette, supra note 92, at 535.
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than optimal default rule if the perceived burden of the default rule
is less than the negotiation costs of an optimum agreement.' 63
In selecting a default rule, first, a court could choose to place
the burden of the event on the person who bears the greater proportion of other risks.'" Since the party conceded with respect to
most of the risks, this approach assumes that the party would have
conceded and accepted the burden of the particular disputed risk
had they negotiated the issue.'65 However, parties usually accept
risks because of risk-prevention status.'" If the burdened party
cannot prevent the risk more effectively than the other party, acceptance of the risk of the event is irrational. 67 Therefore, the
default rule is not what the parties would want. Furthermore, accepting some stated risks does not necessarily indicate a general68
acceptance of risk, especially where the burden is significant.'
Therefore, a court should not assume automatically that the party
who bears the most risk should bear the particular risk at issue.
A second option would be to choose arbitrarily one party to
whom the risk would be assigned. 69 This option presumes that
the importance of certainty outweighs considerations of substance. 7 Clarity reduces negotiation costs because people accept
inferior default rules if the event is sufficiently unlikely to occur. 7 ' Parties preferring an assignment of risk different from the
default rule remain free to contract around the rule." Since clear
rules provide the parties with certainty, the parties assess whether
they prefer the cheaper rule or the more expensive negotiated term,
thereby reducing future litigation costs. " One problem with this

163. Id. at 542.
164. Scott, supra note 92, at 611.
165. See id.
166. See Id. at 603.
167. See id. (explaining that when it is cost-effective for the parties to distribute risls
by contract, the parties will benefit from assigning the risk of contingencies to the party
who is best able to minimize the possibility of that risk).
168. Gillette, supra note 92, at 556 (suggesting that commercial actors "are unlikely to
take low probability risks that threaten substantial losses, notwithstanding that the expected
value justifies the investment.").
169. See Scott, supra note 92, at 606 (explaining that legal default rules demonstrate a
preference to clear, categorical risk assignments as opposed to mutual cooperation which
may require frequent negotiation).
170. Id. at 598.
171. Gillette, supra note 92, at 543, 574.
172. See id. at 574 (arguing that default rules are appropriate, even if only to provide
some basic standard around which parties can negotiate).
173. Id. at 575.
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second option is that the rule may unintentionally provide an advantage to one party; for example, he or she could make negotiation costs of a different term prohibitive for the other party. 74
However, since the parties successfully contracted as to some
terms, presumably both parties perceive a benefit from the contractual relationship. The circumstances of each type of contractual
setting may dictate which of the two options should be used by the
court.
3.

Immutability

When a court adopts a default rule, it must decide whether the
default rule will be immutable. Because an immutable rule limits
the parties' freedom to contract, courts should render default rules
immutable only if society wishes to protect either a party to the
contract or parties outside the contract. ' Theoretically, immutable rules are desirable only if "unregulated contracting would be
socially deleterious because parties internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves".'76 When such concerhs are not present, a simple default rule should be applied so
that parties can still contract as they wish.177
The next section expands upon the foregoing analyses regarding penalty default rules, regular default rules and immutable rules
by reviewing certain events which may arise in the context of a
guarantor relationship. A satisfactory default rule based on the
foregoing is developed for each of the contingent events.

174. See Scott, supra note 92, at 612 (explaining that in specialized commercial transactions, negotiation strategies become more complex and each party becomes increasingly
vulnerable to the demands of the other party).
175. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 88.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 89 (-When the preconditions for immutability are not present, the normative
legal analysis devolves to the choice of a default rule.-). In practice, rules which are not
literally immutable may become immutable through court application. Id. at 121-23; Scott,
supra note 92, at 608. Since the default rule serves to resolve conflicts and provide cheap
options, a court should not favor its default rule over alternatives created by the parties.
Id. Yet courts have refused at times to give effect to private parties' attempts to circumvent default rules. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 121-23. Negotiation costs increase
when circumvention becomes difficult. Id. One option suggested is that the court outline
alternative methods of circumvention when it fashions a default rule. Id. Another option is
to liberally construe contract terms which attempt to circumvent a rule. Id. at 123-24. One
exception to these principles relates to penalty default rules. If a penalty default rule was
fashioned to encourage production of information, circumvention attempts should be closely scrutinized to ensure that the information was produced. Ayres & Gertner, supra note
93, at 124.
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Default Rules For Specific Situations

This section of the note considers and proposes specific default rules for the occurrence of three events when the guaranty
agreement does not specifically address the contingency 178 Given
the factual inquiry involved with tailored default rules, this section
defines untailored default rules. First, the untailored default rule is
developed for the occurrence of Z's termination of a relationship
with Y Next, a rule is proposed for a name change by debtor.
Finally, a rule is developed to deal with a merger involving Y The
discussion assumes that no existing default rule applies to each
situation.
1. Termination of Employment
In the first scenario, Z executes a guaranty while Z is employed by Y The guaranty agreement does not state the parties'
intentions regarding Z's liability as guarantor should Z's employment with Y be terminated. Z leaves the employ of Y The court
can adopt a rule which either continues to hold Z liable under the
guaranty or relieves Z of liability The court could also use a penalty default rule or a rule construing what the parties would have
done had they negotiated the term. In addition, the court must
decide whether the rule should be mutable or immutable.
Under a penalty default rule analysis, the court would place
the burden on the party which neither party would wish to bear the
burden to induce the burdened party to act in a certain way 179
One theory would place the burden on whichever party can more

178. Notes 11 through 21, supra, discuss the guarantor's right to revoke and to be relieved of liability upon the occurrence of an event which materially increases the
guarantor's risk. While the occurrence of each event discussed in this section can be
resolved by the guarantor pursuant to these rights, specific default rules are better than the
general rules. First, revocation requires the guarantor to take action. See supra notes 13-19
and accompanying text. To take the required action, the guarantor must be aware of the
right to revoke. The creditor may not tell the guarantor of this right. See Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 93, at 99. Second, the "material increase in risk" is too vague a
standard to guide the parties as to the allocation of risk upon the occurrence of an event.
See Scott, supra note 92, at 606 (noting the importance of clarity in risk assignment).
Thus, the parties cannot determine whether a court will deem an event a material change,
or a risk increase substantial.
179. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text. The court could also choose not to
enforce the guaranty. However, the guarantor seeks nonenforcement. Therefore, nonenforcement places the burden on the creditor. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 96-97.
Consequently, nonenforcement is not a realistic option.
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cheaply obtain information regarding the event. 80 Even if this
person cannot control or prevent the risk, and therefore would not
normally accept the risk, the burden minimizes strategic withholding of information by the burdened party.",
In the employment termination scenario, neither party may
have access to the information. Y may not welcome inquiries from
Z regarding Z's employment status. In addition, even if Z voluntarily leaves Y, that "information" is not likely to be known even
to Z at the time the guaranty is executed." Conceivably, X's influence over Y puts X in the better position to obtain information
regarding Z's employment. It is unclear, however, whether Z or X
can obtain the information more cheaply. If neither party has access to the information because it is unavailable, strategic withholding is not a problem. Therefore, disclosure of information
about how likely it is that Z's employment will be terminated
cannot justify the use of a penalty default rule.
A second theory places the burden on the more experienced
party.' 83 The party with superior knowledge regarding potential
contingencies, probabilities, and applicable default rules may withhold the information from the other party.'m By withholding the
information, the more experienced party can avoid costly negotiations, including negotiation necessary to circumvent a default rule
favorable to the experienced party, and preserve that advantage
even though the parties never addressed the issue.'85
In the employment termination scenario, the creditor is usually
the more experienced party. First, creditors do not generally extend
credit without some experience in the field. Second, the creditor's
cognizance of the risk is evidenced by the creditor's decision to
require Z to execute a guaranty before lending to Y. Finally, the
creditor typically drafts the guaranty 6 and would generally be
knowledgeable about default rules. Thus the creditory is generally
the more experienced party to a guaranty agreement. Given a
choice between a penalty default rule which burdens the creditor,

180. See Kronman, supra note 115, at 2-4.
181. Id.
182. Z would probably not execute a guaranty for the debts of a corporation Z intends
to leave.
183. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 99.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 119.
186. See supra note 10.
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who is generally the more experienced party, and a regular default
rule which burdens the guarantor, a court could reasonably conclude that the penalty default rule is justified to ensure that the
creditor provides the guarantor information about the probabilities
of employment termination and the legal consequences thereof.
The court could also develop a default rule which allocates the
risk of the event the way the parties would have." 7 One view
advocates placing the burden on the party who bears the greater
risk, reasoning that the parties would have agreed to place this
particular burden on the same party. However, Z would not likely
assent to assume this risk if the parties negotiated the term. Once
Z's relationship with Y is terminated, Z cannot monitor or control
the level of risk. In addition, Z no longer derives any benefit from
the extension of credit to Y. While the creditor would prefer that Z
assume the risk of termination of employment, a fully informed
guarantor would not want to accept it.
Another view places the burden on the best risk-preventer
because that party could reasonably concede during negotiation to
accept the risk.' 8 The guarantor cannot prevent loss of employment, however. An employee can attempt to retain his or her job,
but neither fool-proof preventive steps nor post-occurrence insurance exists. Z can prevent voluntary termination of his or her employment. Z's termination, however, does not in and of itself create
a burden which needs to be allocated since Y is primarily liable on
the debt. So long as Y continues to perform, the risk to be prevented is Y's non-payment. Therefore, risk prevention analysis does
not advance the inquiry.
Alternatively, the court can adopt a clear and certain rule,
regardless of which party bears the burden."8 9 If the court places
the burden on the guarantor, the guarantor's liability will extend
beyond the guarantor's employment with the debtor. The costs
associated with bargaining around the default rule could effectively
prohibit circumvention. The guarantor will wish to limit his liability to the term of his or her employment. The guarantor will obtain

187. Scott, supra note 92, at 597-98. The relative positions of the parties to the agreement enable courts to predict whether the parties would have chosen the default rule if
they had bargained for the term initially. Id.
188. See Scott, supra note 92, at 603 (stating that the first thing negotiating parties seek
to do is allocate and thereby reduce their personal risk).
189. See Scott, supra note 92, at 606. This argument is based upon the assumption that
even an inferior default rule reduces negotiation costs by not forcing the parties to reach
specific agreement on minor contingencies before the agreement is signed. Id.
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this limited liability term only if the creditor allows it at a cost
lower than the benefit derived from the term. This is unlikely to
occur. The creditor will discourage limited liability and raise the
cost of negotiation. Because the creditor is generally in a better
bargaining position than the guarantor, a default rule in favor of
the creditor grants the creditor an undue advantage over the guarantor.
Conversely, if a court places the burden on the creditor, then
the guarantor is relieved of liability unless the contract provides
otherwise. The creditor then has three options: (1) bargain for
liability beyond employment; (2) bargain for notice upon termination of employment; or (3) accept the default rule relieving the
guarantor of liability upon termination of employment. It is unlikely that the creditor will accept the default rule. However, the creditor will generally be in a position to bargain for one of the other
options. In view of the creditor's influence over the debtor and the
guarantor, the creditor, at very little cost, will generally be able to
extend the guarantor's liability beyond employment."9 Thus the
creditor will be able to achieve its optimum term at a fairly low
cost. 191

Both the penalty default rule analysis and the default rule
analysis favor a rule terminating Z's liability under the guaranty
upon Z's termination of employment. Since the default rule analysis demonstrates that the parties would accept that term, a penalty
default rule is not necessary. Therefore, the court should establish a
default rule which relieves Z of liability upon termination of Z's
employment relationship with Y."9
2.

Name Change by Debtor

Second, assume Z executes a guaranty covering credit extended by X to Y. Subsequently, Y changes its name to ABC. Should Z
continue to be liable for credit extended to ABC, or should the
guaranty be construed to hold Z liable only for credit extended to
the corporation when its name was Y? The court could institute a
penalty default rule or a regular default rule which places the burden on X or Z.
A penalty default rule is appropriate if the court believes that

190. When no negotiation is allowed by one party, no negotiation costs are incurred.
191. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 116.
192. The courts should then liberally construe attempts to circumvent the rules.
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one or both parties have information which should be released to
the other party during negotiation. 93 The guarantor, because of
his connection with the debtor, is more likely to have knowledge
regarding the possibility of Y changing its name."9 By placing
the burden on Z, the court encourages Z either to accept continued
liability when Y changes its name or to investigate and disclose the
possibility of a name change to X to avoid liability. 95 Furthermore, Z may usually obtain this kind of information more cheaply
than X because of Z's relationship to Y.'96
Another penalty default theory favors placing the burden on X,
the party more experienced or familiar with the guaranty relationship.' 97 However, while X may know in the abstract the probability that a debtor changes names, Z can better calculate the particular probability of a name change by Y. Thus, if courts create a
penalty default rule, the guarantor's liability under the guaranty
should continue beyond a debtor's name change.' 8
Under a regular default rule analysis, the court should place
the burden on Z because the parties would place the burden on
Z. 99 If the parties knew at the time of negotiation that Y might
change its name, the parties would have addressed and allocated
the risk involved.2" Since a name change does not increase Z's
193. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 94.
194. Kronman's concerns do not affect this situation because the information is unlikely
to involve acquisition costs. See Kronman, supra note 115, at 4.
195. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 98 (stating that "when the rationale is to
inform the relatively uninformed contracting party, the penalty default should be against
the relatively informed party").
196. See Kronman, supra note 115, at 2-4 (arguing that one individual may be able to
obtain information more cheaply than another and that a court concerned with economic
efficiency should impose the risk on the better information gatherers).
197. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 99 (asserting that setting the default rule
in favor of the uninformed party will induce the informed party to reveal information and
increase efficiency).
198. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 94, 96-97 (maintaining efficiency demands
that strategic incompleteness be avoided by inducing parties to reveal information and
contract around default rules). A court need not strictly scrutinize circumvention attempts,
as the creditor, in whose favor the rule operates, generally drafts the agreement and has
more bargaining power to dictate terms. A debtor attempting to circumvent may not be
able to dictate an exact term which clearly evidences an intent to circumvent.
199. Scott, supra note 92, at 598-99 (stating that an accepted tenet of commercial contract theory holds "in filling gaps in contracts, the law should devise strategies that replicate the agreement the particular disputants would have specified"). The courts have noted
that a name change by the debtor does not represent a change which substantially increases the guarantor's liability so as to justify release. E.g., United States Shoe Corp. v.
Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1986) ("changes in the . . . name of the obligor do
not affect a guaranty").
200. See Scott, supra note 92, at 603 (maintaining that parties can distribute the risk of
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risk exposure as a guarantor, Z would rationally agree to concede
to this term. 2°' Y remains the debtor (albeit under a different
name), and presumably Y's financial situation will not be affected
by a name change. Furthermore, if there is an added risk, Z is in a
better position to know, and if possible reduce, such resultant
risk. 2
X, on the other hand, will try to avoid accepting the risk of
an event occurring (i) over which X has no control, (ii) about
which X would not have ready information, and (iii) by which X
exposes itself to increased risk of Z being released from secondary
liability as guarantor. 20 3 Further, such a rule is clear and definite.2"° Thus, courts should adopt a default rule which requires
that the guarantor's liability continues regardless of a name change
by the debtor.
Both the penalty default rule analysis and the regular default
rule analysis favor the guarantor's continued liability. Because most
parties would place the burden of a name change on Z, a penalty
default rule is not required. The court should adopt a rule which
states that the guarantor's liability continues despite the name
change by the debtor.
3.

Merger

In the third scenario, Y merges with a separate corporation to
form CD Corporation. A court can terminate Z's liability upon
occurrence of the merger or continue Z's liability despite the merger. The court should consider general bargaining strategies in selecting a rule.20 5 The court may choose a penalty default rule or
a general default rule.
A penalty default rule serves to provide incentive to one party
to fill the gap in the contract with an alternative term.2° Since

foreseeable contingencies and can contract to reduce the amount of risk).
201. See Coleman et al., supra note 92, at 651, 660.
202. See Scott, supra note 92, at 603 (positing that by assigning the entire risk to the
party best able to reduce the amount of risk, the parties can contract to reduce the
amount of risk each faces).
203. See id.
204. Id. at 606 (stating the default rules of contract law reveal a preference for clearly
categorized assignments of risk).
205. For discussion and an analysis of theories concerning the use of default rules and
their relation to contract formation, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93; Coleman et al.,
supra note 92; Gillette, supra note 92; Scott, supra note 92.
206. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 91.
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7
one goal is the disclosure of information during negotiation,20
the parties' respective knowledge about the possibility of a merger
is important. Since the creditor, X, is more experienced m this type
of transaction, X presumably has superior knowledge about the
likelihood of a merger. 20" However, since the guarantor, Z, has a
closer relationship with y,209 Z presumably knows more about the
probability of Y merging.2 0 Unless the merger is foreseeable at
the time the parties execute the guaranty, however, the court need
not provide an incentive to either party to discuss the issue.
A court may decide, however, that X should disclose to Z the
effect a merger would have on Z's liability Information regarding
any default rule is relevant to bargaining. 2 1 Even if an existing
rule does not decisively address the result of a merger, information
regarding the "material increase in risk" rule is relevant, including
the rule's shortcomings.2 12 Since a creditor is unlikely to inform
the guarantor how existing contract provisions might be affected by
default rules, a penalty default rule which terminates the
guarantor's liability upon a merger involving the debtor might be
justified.213
In fashioning a regular default rule, the court should fill in the
gap as the parties would have if they had negotiated about the
occurrence of the risk.2t4 If Z is in a position to control the risk,
then the parties would likely agree to place the burden on Z"
Z's control is not absolute, however.

207. See id. at 97.
208. See Id. at 98 ("If one side is repeatedly in the relevant contractual setting while
the other side rarely is, it is a sensible presumption that the former is better informed
than the latter.").
209. Z may actually be involved in deciding whether to merge, either as a director
submitting the issue to the shareholders or as a shareholder casting a vote.
210. As mergers are relatively serious matters, even officers would likely be aware of
any possibility of a merger at the time the parties execute the guaranty.
211. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 99.
212. Shortcomings include the lack of clarity as to what changes a court will deem
material and as to what a court will decide is a substantial increase i risk. See Scott,
supra note 92, at 606.
213. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 93, at 94-100.
214. See Scott, supra note 92, at 598. The court could also choose a clear and definite
rule, even if it is not precisely what the parties would want. See itd.
215. In a closely held corporation, a guarantor who is also a shareholder or director
would be able to control to some extent the risk of a merger. See HARRY G. HENN &
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, 696 (3d ed. 1983). A guarantor who is a
director, however, may face a conflict of interest if the merger would be in the best interests of the corporation but would also increase the director's exposure under the guaranty. See id. at 637.
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If neither party would necessarily accept the risk at the negotiation stage, the court should fashion a clear and definite rule. 6
The court must be sensitive, however, to any incidential advantage
given to the unburdened party.2 17 If the court places the burden
on Z, X may amass further bargaining power and thereby obtain
other terms favorable to X. If the court places the burden on X, X
will presumably be able to circumvent the rule by contract, at a
fairly low cost, because of X's power over Z who wants to procure
the loan for Y.2 8 Therefore, the default rule should place the burden of the occurrence of a merger on X.
V.

CONCLUSION

A guaranty agreement provides that the guarantor will pay the
debtor's obligation to the creditor if the debtor defaults. Creditors
use guaranty agreements to reduce the risk of non-payment by the
debtor. While courts routinely enforce guaranties, commentators
have not addressed the justifications for enforcing the agreements.
The four contract theories addressed in this note justify enforcement of a guaranty in the model guaranty context. Yet, when
an event occurs upon which the contract is silent, the theories fail
to justify enforcement and offer no guidance for completing gaps
in a contract.
Default theories attempt to formulate a method to fill in those
gaps. This note proposes a default rule to relieve the guarantor of
liability upon termination of the guarantor's employment relationship with the debtor. The creditor, as the more experienced party,
presumably has superior knowledge regarding the probability of termination, and the result of an occurrence. Thus, a default rule
should place the burden related to termination of the guarantor's
relationship on the creditor.
This note also proposes a default rule which does not relieve
the guarantor of liability upon a name change by the debtor. The
guarantor would rationally concede to accept liability since the
guarantor's risk remains unaffected. In addition, the typical creditor
would not accept the risk since the creditor could not control it,
might not have immediate notice, and would suffer an increased

216.
217.
218.
bility

Scott, supra note 92, at 606.
Gillette, supra note 92, at 574.
The creditor could add a term requiring notice of the merger or stating that liacontinued despite any merger.
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risk immediately upon the occurrence of the event.
Finally, this note suggests a default rule providing that a
merger involving the debtor should relieve the guarantor of liability. A clear and definite assignment of risk notifies parties of the
allocation which will be made upon the occurrence of a merger.
Creditors remain free to contract around the rule. Since creditors
generally command more bargaining power than guarantors, the
creditor will be better able to dictate an alternative term efficiently.
This note proposes rules for guaranty contracts based on the
intent of most parties regarding the occurrence of an event. The
rules proposed in this note are clearer than existing rules for guaranty agreements, which often create results contrary to what the
parties would decide had they negotiated every contingency. While
commentators have addressed the creation of default rules in other
contractual contexts, the law of guaranty agreements has remained
virtually static. Thus, this note urges courts to analyze current and
future default rules in the guaranty context to create bargaining in
the optimal environment for guaranty agreements. That would be a
default rule to benefit all parties.
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